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ABSTRACT: Recently, scholars have disputed whether Locke’s political theory should be read as the 
groundwork of secular liberalism or as a Protestant political theology. Focusing on Locke’s mature 
theory of toleration, the article raises a central question: What if these two readings are compatible? 
That is, what would be the consequences if Locke’s political philosophy has theological foundations, 
but has also given shape to secular liberalism? Examining Locke’s theory in the Letter Concerning 
Toleration (1689), the article argues that this is indeed the case.  The liberal model of toleration is a 
secularization of the theology of Christian liberty and its division of society into a temporal political 
kingdom and the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Therefore, when liberal toleration travels beyond the 
boundaries of the Christian West or when western societies become multicultural, it threatens to 
lose its intelligibility.  
 









The literature regarding John Locke’s political philosophy and its relation to his religious 
background is so plentiful that one hesitates to contribute another analysis. Yet, a fascinating 
problem emerges from the current debate. Basically, this debate revolves around the following issue: 
Was Locke a truly modern thinker whose ideas shaped liberal democracy and the secular state? Or is 
this classic image mistaken and did Protestant religious doctrine constitute and constrain his 
thinking? Two camps of Locke interpreters can be opposed along the lines of the answers they give 
to these questions. 
 But what if both readings are right? What if Locke’s political thought is deeply theological and 
has also laid the foundations of the liberal secular state? What would be the implications for the 
status of contemporary liberalism? We will argue that these two interpretations are not incompatible. 
Focusing on Locke’s mature philosophy of toleration in the Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), we will 
demonstrate that the modern liberal model shares its basic structure with Locke’s model of 
toleration and that this structure derives from the theologies of the Protestant Reformation. 
 Our thesis is that liberal toleration is a secularized replica of a theological model that divided 
society into the political kingdom of human authority and the spiritual kingdom of Christian liberty. 
The liberal model results from an internal Christian dynamic of secularization, which reproduces 
theological principles in secular guise, instead of emancipating political thought from religious 
constraints. Consequently, liberal toleration threatens to become unintelligible, when it travels 
beyond the boundaries of the Christian West or when it has to accommodate communities from 
other cultures. 
LOCKE’S LEGACY AND LIBERAL TOLERATION 
In recent years a key debate has arisen about the philosophical legacy of John Locke. On the one 
hand, we have authors who assert that he is one of the chief architects of secular liberalism. Hence, 
his political theory should be interpreted to reveal its relevance to today’s political problems. Michael 
 3 
Zuckert argues that Locke “is a decidedly modern philosopher” and that liberal democracy is “a 
system clearly descended from Lockean liberalism.”1 Similarly, many authors endorse the continuing 
significance of Locke’s political thought and locate the prototypical model of liberal toleration in his 
writings.2
 On the other hand, we have authors who question the relevance of Locke’s political theory to 
secular liberal democracy. This camp suggests that his thought is deeply rooted in the religious views 
of his day. In a classical study, John Dunn argues “the intimate dependence of an extremely high 
proportion of Locke’s arguments for their very intelligibility, let alone plausibility, on a series of 
theological commitments.”
 
3 John Marshall and Richard Ashcraft agree that “Locke’s theology” was 
“the central axiom of his political theory.”4
 More recently, Jeremy Waldron demonstrates that Locke’s conception of equality depends on 
theological premises. “The theological content cannot simply be bracketed off as a curiosity,” he 
says, for it “shapes and informs the account through and through.” Independent of its religious 
concerns, this conception is “simply unintelligible” and therefore “Lockean equality is not fit to be 
taught as a secular doctrine, it is a conception of equality that makes no sense except in the light of a 
particular account of the relation between man and God.”
 
5 Again we can add several authors who 
tie Locke to his historical settings or identify Protestant doctrine as the foundation of his political 
theory.6
 Generations of eminent scholars have discussed Locke as though his essential ideas are 
independent of theological premises. Good reasons are available for the belief that Locke’s political 
theory is significant to contemporary liberal democracy: the continuities between his notions of 
toleration, equality and rights and those which prevail today are striking. His texts have been 
interpreted to make them intelligible to contemporary minds. Still, the advocates of the thesis that 
Locke’s political thought depends on theological premises make a cogent case. Both Dunn and 
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Waldron demonstrate in detail that one cannot grasp many of his claims without a Protestant 
background. 
 Why is it so important to know whether or not Lockean toleration depends on theological 
premises? If this is the case, the conclusion is inescapable that his philosophy is not intelligible when 
taken as secular political theory. This generates a set of problems with regard to the status of liberal 
toleration. First, it means that one could make sense of Lockean toleration only within the framework 
of Christian doctrine. Why, then, has it been understood by so many as religiously neutral? 
 Second, it could be the case that modern liberal toleration is not related to Locke’s Christian 
thought. Then why have liberal theorists made the mistake of regarding him as their philosophical 
ancestor, and why do so many feel that our world “is very much a Lockean world”?7
 Third, it could be the case that modern liberal toleration is sustained by the same conceptual 
scheme as Locke’s model. Then the implication would be that—unless given a separate secular 
foundation—the modern notion also depends on Christian theological premises. In other words, the 
validity of liberal toleration would be limited to Christian societies. In that case, two consequences 
are of importance. One: it entails that the political reasoning of contemporary western liberal 
societies operates within the same religious framework. That is, neither western theories of 
toleration nor their theorists have become secular. Two: in nonwestern societies, this value fails to 
make sense and thus it could hardly be a norm for all plural societies. Such a situation jeopardizes 
the foundations of liberal toleration, since it requires universal validity to make sense as a normative 
 Moreover, one 
should account for the persistent illusion that Lockean toleration shares its basic structure with the 
modern liberal value. Even if one discards these views as false consciousness, one should explain the 
nature of the illusion. Galileo told us why the sun seemed to revolve round the earth; equally, the 
minimal requirement for saving the phenomena is an explanation of the perspective of 
contemporary liberals. 
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political model. In this case, it would be accessible only to Christian believers or those raised in a 
culture constituted by Christianity. 
 Waldron notes the problem with regards to the notion of equality: “It may seem to us now that 
we can make do with a purely secular notion of human equality; but as a matter of ethical history, 
that notion has been shaped and fashioned on the basis of religion. That is where all the hard work 
was done.” Maybe, he writes, “the notion of humans as one another’s equals will begin to fall apart, 
under pressure, without the presence of the religious conception that shaped it.”8
THE PREDICAMENT OF LIBERAL TOLERATION 
 Could the same be 
true for the liberal model of toleration? 
In the Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Locke intends to “distinguish exactly the business of civil 
government from that of religion, and to settle the just bonds that lie between the one and the 
other.”9
 This commonwealth is “a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and 
advancing their own civil interests.” It has nothing to do with the religious pursuits of its members. 
Therefore, “the jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments” and it 
“neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the soul and its pursuit of salvation.”
 Basically, he divides human social life into two spheres: the sphere of civil interests and that 
of religious pursuits. The civil interests pertain to the liberty and health of the body, and to the 
possession of outward things such as money, lands and furniture. Human beings are obliged to enter 
into society to secure these interests. Thus, “the commonwealth” comes into being.  
10 By 
“magistrate,” Locke understands “the supreme legislative power of any society, not considering the 
form of government or number of persons wherein it is placed.”11
 
 His claim is that any supreme 
legislative power is restricted to the civil interests of its subjects. The realm of religion is exempt 
from its authority. This is the core of Lockean toleration. 
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The Liberal Spheres 
Today, liberal toleration still claims that society consists of two separate spheres: a public political 
sphere and a private sphere of religion or substantive conceptions of the good. As long as the rule of 
law is respected, the liberal state ought not to interfere in the religious and moral life of its subjects.12 
Until recently, the commitment to individual autonomy was the foundation for this principle; now, 
neutrality towards all substantive conceptions of the good does the job.13
 Even this new form of political liberalism retains the twofold structure: liberal toleration still 
depends on dividing human existence into a private personal sphere, in which our comprehensive 
moral or religious doctrines shape our lives and guide our actions, and a public political sphere, 
which ought to be governed in terms of a neutral conception of justice. As human beings, we live in 
two spheres and suffer from a corresponding split of identity: as “citizens” we are subject to state 
coercion in the public sphere; as “private persons” we are free. 
  
 This twofold structure raises a basic problem: how to identify the two spheres? Where to draw 
the boundary at the normative level, or what is the limit or scope of toleration?14
 The main criterion today is the harm principle: only those practices which do not harm others 
ought to be tolerated. From Mill’s On Liberty (1859) onwards, this has been invoked as the standard 
in liberal philosophy, politics and jurisprudence.
 Obviously, 
immoral behaviors such as murder, torture or child abuse ought not to be tolerated; but there are 
dubious cases, from pornography to public smoking. What criterion would help determine the scope 
of the liberal value of toleration? Where does the sphere of liberty end and that of state coercion 
begin? This has been a central concern of liberal theorists throughout the past few centuries. 
15 Given this, the question how we know whether or 
not our action harms others becomes crucial. If it comprises of direct physical harm only, the 
principle would not help fix the boundary between the spheres of liberty and coercion. It is difficult 
to prove that even such flagrant violations of the value of liberty as slavery cause direct physical 
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harm as long as the slaves are “treated well.” However, once we go beyond physical harm, the 
obscurity of the harm principle surfaces.16
 The contemporary human sciences cannot provide us with a sound foundation for standards 
like the harm principle. Consequently, the difference between the sphere of personal liberty and that 
of state coercion becomes subjective, in the sense that it rests on other factual premises. That is, 
depending upon one’s metaphysical premises, one distinguishes between the two spheres differently. 
At the normative level, it becomes impossible to separate them. 
 It is often impossible to find out whether an action of 
ours harms others. For instance, criticisms which hurt a person’s ego may be seen as attempts to 
ruin his psychological health or as efforts to help the person become happier. Hence, if the harm 
principle embraces mental distress, it becomes indeterminate because no viable criteria exist to 
determine when one’s conduct is psychologically harmful to another. 
The Puzzle of the Two Spheres 
What then is the status of the twofold structure of liberal toleration? How could we clarify the 
distinction between the public sphere of political coercion and the private sphere of religious 
freedom? If we want to explain the value of toleration to the non-modern, non-liberal or the 
nonwestern world, we cannot assume that human lives have such a “natural” dual structure. The 
challenge is to provide a criterion to identify either of the two spheres at the empirical level. How to 
do so? The public or political sphere appears to refer to the domain of the state and its legal 
apparatus, whereas the private sphere of religion consists of what is left over. But this does not allow 
us to identify these spheres, since any domain of human existence is subject to state laws at some 
point, while free from them at other points. 
 Many theorists argue that “the distinction between the public and the private…is a slippery one, 
incapable of being established in a way that accords either with an adequate empirical description of 
the major institutions of modern society or with satisfactory normative justifications” and conclude 
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that it concerns “a shifting and uncertain boundary.”17 Such remarks could be indefinitely 
multiplied.18 Similar points are made about the division between the religious and the political: in 
spite of the plethora of definitions of “religion,” we do not possess a sound theoretical criterion to 
identify the realm of religion or distinguish it from the political realm.19
 To say that the boundary is “constantly being renegotiated” or is “an essentially contested 
distinction” evades the issue. The difficulty does not revolve around where the line is drawn between 
the two spheres. Consider the case of a country and its borders. The renegotiation of the borders 
does not make the country unidentifiable. Rather, the problem is to describe what lies within the 
borders. Even if its borders change, France remains recognizable. One can still identify it as a 
distinct nation-state. In the same way, the puzzle of the two spheres is not about the precise location 
of the boundaries. To make sense of the distinction, one should be able to recognize or identify at 
least one of the two spheres. Either one possesses a criterion to identify the private sphere of 
religious liberty and distinguish it from its public political counterpart, or vice versa. Such a criterion 
would describe the properties of one of the two spheres. Surely one needs such a criterion, when 
one’s normative political theory divides society into two separate realms.
 
20
The Lockean Spheres 
 
If Lockean toleration requires such a twofold division of society, then it may also confront a similar 
difficulty. Admittedly, Locke says, “a good life” involves religion and piety, but it “concerns also the 
civil government.”21
Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery; whose happiness 
depending upon his believing and doing those things in life, which are necessary to the 
obtaining of God’s favour, and are prescribed by God to that end: it follows from thence, first, 
 Moral actions fall under the jurisdictions of both magistrate and conscience. 
This creates the danger of one encroaching upon the other. Therefore, it is of vital import to 
distinguish between these two realms. First, Locke characterizes the realm of religion: 
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that the observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon mankind, and that 
our utmost care, application, and diligence ought to be exercised in the search and performance 
of them; because there is nothing in this world that is of any consideration in comparison with 
eternity. Secondly, that seeing one man does not violate the right of another, by his erroneous 
opinions, and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man’s 
affairs; therefore the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself.22
The realm of religion is that of the immortal souls of all human beings, who strive for salvation by 
worshipping God. It is the other eternal world, whose obligations override everything else from this world. 
At most, human beings can try to persuade each other of the truth of a particular doctrine or form 
of worship, but “all force and compulsion are to be forborn” in this realm.
 
23
But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal lives here upon earth; 
the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several 
outward conveniencies to the support thereof, which are to be procured by pains and 
industry…But the pravity of mankind being such, that they had rather injuriously prey upon the 
fruits of other men’s labours than take pains to provide for themselves; the necessity of 
preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired, and also of 
preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges 
men to enter into society with one another; that by mutual assistance and joint force, they may 
secure unto each other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and 
happiness of this life…
 In the realm of civil 
interests, however, force and compulsion are necessary: 
24
This realm corresponds to the temporal lives of human beings on earth, where they need material 
goods to survive. They enter into civil society to protect these interests. This happens through the 
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creation of an “original compact,” in which they agree to entrust the power to protect their temporal 
goods to the civil authority. 
 The reason for entering into civil society also determines the boundaries of its legislative power: 
it ought to be directed only towards “the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society,” and 
“it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that is, that 
every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on 
whose good pleasure and acceptance depends his eternal happiness.”25
 “There is a twofold society,” Locke had stated in an earlier note, “of which almost all men in 
the world are members, and that from the twofold concernment they have to attain a twofold 
happiness; viz. that of this world and that of the other: and hence there arises these two following 
societies, viz. religious and civil.”
 Locke’s text leaves no doubt: 
religion is the spiritual realm of the human soul, which is free from human authority and laws; the 
commonwealth is the temporal realm of the human body subject to the legislative power of the 
magistrate. 
26 On the basis of this distinction, Locke explained the view of 
toleration which he would develop more fully in his Essay on Toleration and in the letters concerning 
toleration.27
CHRISTIAN LIBERTY AND ITS TWO KINGDOMS 
 This theological division between civil and religious society, between this world and the 
other, between the body and the soul, is necessary to make his theory intelligible. 
The Letter Concerning Toleration was not the first text on the subject in the seventeenth-century 
England. The question of toleration had brought about heated disputes between the Anglicans, 
Puritans and radical Protestants.28
 The Reformation transformed the earlier Christian relationship between the spiritual and the 
temporal worlds dramatically. Whereas the earlier medieval distinction was between the clergy and 
 There is no need to go into the details of these debates; a brief 
sketch of their shared framework will do for us. 
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the laity, this hierarchical division was now rejected. Luther argued from the 1520s that no spiritual 
estate of priests could exist as opposed to a temporal estate of laymen. All human beings lived in 
these two worlds simultaneously. All believers were priests and all souls ought to be free so that they 
might be “regenerated” by the Holy Spirit.29 This was the core idea of “Christian liberty.” As sinners, 
we fail to submit ourselves to the will of God. Therefore, the divine will has to act in each one of us 
and instill true faith in our hearts.30
 The Protestant notion of Christian liberty implied that all human laws in the spiritual realm 
were violations of true religion. The canon law of the Roman Church, John Calvin asserted in his 
Institutes (1559), had denied this liberty and invaded the Kingdom of Christ, and “thus the freedom 
given by him to the conscience of the believers is utterly oppressed and cast down.” The main 
problem was that human laws were prescribed as though they were spiritual, “enjoining things 
necessary to salvation,” but “our consciences do not have to do with men but with God alone. This 
is the purpose of that common distinction between the earthly forum and the forum of conscience.” 
If “God is the sole lawgiver,” Calvin concluded, “men are not permitted to usurp this honor.”
 
31
 This notion gave rise to a political theology which became central to the early modern notion of 
toleration, viz. the theory of the two kingdoms. In Calvin’s words, “there is a twofold government in 
man: one aspect is spiritual, whereby the conscience is instructed in piety and in reverencing God; 
the second is political, whereby man is educated for the duties of humanity and citizenship that must 
be maintained among men.” These are the “spiritual” and “temporal” jurisdictions, he added, “by 
which is meant that the former sort of government pertains to the life of the soul, while the latter 
has to do with the concerns of the present life—not only with food and clothing but with laying 
down laws whereby a man may live his life among other men holily, honorably, and temperately.” 
The first is the spiritual kingdom, which resides in the inner mind, while the second is the political 
kingdom, which “regulates only outward behavior.”
 
32 Luther emphasized this point in his tract on 
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Temporal Government (1523): “The temporal government has laws which extend no further than to life 
and property and external affairs on earth, for God cannot and will not permit anyone but himself to 
rule over the soul.”33
 The theology of the two kingdoms claimed the following: (a) all human beings live in two 
spheres—the spiritual kingdom of Christ and the political kingdom of human authority; (b) in the 
spiritual sphere, they strive for the salvation of their souls, which is purely an individual affair over 
which God alone has authority; (c) in the temporal sphere, they are sinful bodies who pursue the 
preservation of their earthly interests and must always obey the laws of the secular powers. The two 
kingdoms should never be mixed up—the state should never prescribe laws in the spiritual realm—
for this was equivalent to ranking human authority above that of God. Although it would take time 
before Protestants also practiced this theology, it provided the framework within which debates on 
toleration took place. 
 
 Turning back to Locke’s mature theory of toleration, his basic conceptual scheme is virtually 
identical to that of the theology of Christian liberty. Luther and Calvin claimed that God’s promise 
of grace in Christ makes religion free from all human laws. But, they added, this freedom was 
confined to the spiritual realm of the soul, which could be regenerated by the Holy Spirit. The carnal 
body would always be sinful and therefore it ought to be subject to the laws of the temporal power. 
God had dispensed a fraction of His sovereignty to the princes so that they may restrain human 
depravity. Neither the prince nor the priest, however, had the authority to infringe upon the 
relationship between God and each soul. 
 In Locke’s theory, the sovereignty of the civil government is justified in terms of a social 
contract, but its justification of political coercion is very similar. As he puts it, “the pravity of 
mankind being such, that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men’s labours 
than take pains to provide for themselves,” men are obliged to enter into society and bestow a 
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coercive power on the civil government.34
 Our hypothesis is the following: the model of liberal toleration of Locke and later liberal 
thinkers is a secularized replica of the theological model of Christian liberty and its two kingdoms. 
The model has been secularized in the sense that certain theological premises and details have been 
discarded, while retaining its basic conceptual structure. In Locke’s Letter, this theology is still 
explicit. Many have shown how most of his arguments for toleration are theological in nature.
 This is another way of saying that carnal man is a sinful 
being, who needs to be restrained through coercive laws. The soul is liberated from human laws 
through the liberty and power of the Christian faith. And so it is in Locke’s theory of toleration: the 
temporal life of our depraved bodies in civil society is subject to the sovereign of the original 
compact; the religious life of our souls becomes a sovereign sphere in and of itself. 
35 
Locke’s conception of the church as “a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together to 
their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God” also presupposes the ultimate 
autonomy of the believer’s soul in his relation to God.36
 The theological framework in which it is cast precludes this model of toleration from including 
those religions which do not live up to its separation of civil and religious society. As Locke wrote: 
“That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a 
bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the protection 
and service of another prince.”
  
37
RETHINKING LOCKEAN TOLERATION 
 This excluded Catholicism as long as it demanded obedience to the 
papal hierarchy. The model also ruled out opinions that were thought to destroy civil society, such as 
atheism. This was the case, because the limits of Locke’s toleration were fixed by the theology of 
Christian liberty and its view of true religion. 
Can Locke’s model of toleration liberate itself from this theological framework? In a recent article, 
Alex Tuckness seeks to demonstrate the significance of Locke to contemporary liberalism by 
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recuperating certain elements from the letters on toleration: (a) the argument that one ought not to 
suppress any religion, since all human beings are fallible in matters of religious truth and (b) the 
principle that all religions ought to be tolerated as long as they do not harm human beings or civil 
society in general.38
 How does Locke’s theory resolve the predicament of moral and religious diversity in society? 
Imagine a situation where two civil magistrates believe that they each have the true religion. Could 
they, as magistrates, act upon this belief? According to Tuckness, Locke suggests that in such cases 
one must move to the perspective of a legislator who formulates a principle that will guide both 
magistrates. In Locke’s account, the legislator is God, who would never allow the magistrates to 
impose their religion on the subjects, for He takes into account the fallibility of the agents who will 
carry out His instructions. This is what Tuckness calls “the legislative point of view.”
 
39 In his 
interpretation of Locke, this is taken as a reasonable secular principle for legislators, since “a 
magistrate trying to decide whether or not to suppress a religion he believes dangerous would have 
to ask not only whether suppressing the religion would promote the public good but also whether it 
would promote the public good for other magistrates to act on the same principle.”40
 Tuckness argues this principle is worth saving from Locke’s argument. He separates four 
different levels. At the first level, there are Locke’s theological foundations: 
  
At level two there is the general principle…that our political principles be ones that we 
would want others who are fallible and partial like ourselves to interpret and apply. The 
specific principle (level three)…was that the magistrate should not tolerate those beliefs that 
would be incompatible with the possibility of civil society if widely held.41
At the fourth level, Locke argued against the toleration of certain variants of Catholicism and 
atheism. Tuckness discards both Locke’s level-four argument and his level-one theological 
commitments, while retaining the general and the specific principle.  
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 How are these elements from Locke’s theory significant to contemporary political theory? First, 
“Locke’s level-two argument…gives us a more reliable way of taking human fallibility into account.” 
Second, the specific principle “to suppress only those beliefs that would make civil society 
impossible if widely held,” is widely accepted. Third, one of the strengths of this interpretation is 
that the general principle constrains the specific principle. Tuckness takes the example of the 
expression of racist ideas in society. These certainly cause harm, yet we have doubts about the 
refusal to tolerate such ideas: “Given the tremendous harm that the expression of racist ideas can 
cause, why should such speech be protected?” The general principle gives us a good reason to do so: 
“We tolerate racist ideas because the alternative would give too much power to fallible and partial 
human beings, not because racist ideas have intrinsic value.”42
 Let us look at his suggestions in the following light: Is it possible to divorce the second level 
arguments of Locke from his theological arguments? As Tuckness himself claims, the level two 
arguments are derived from theological arguments.
 In this manner, levels two and three 
of Locke’s theory allow us to address certain problems of secular political theory. 
43 Thus, to what extent is the level two principle 
independent of Christian theology? First of all, it requires noting that no human being, ever, could 
really assume a “legislative point of view,” namely, the perspective of the Lockean Legislator, who is 
none other than God. A magistrate could assume such a point of view only if he was infallible and 
complete, the way God is. If a person is capable of formulating a principle assuming a legislative 
point of view, it is not obvious why the same person is denied the possibility of also giving an 
interpretation from the same point of view. How is it possible to suggest that one’s political 
principle does not reflect one’s partiality and fallibility, whereas one’s interpretation and application 
of the same principle does? The very possibility of talking about fallible and partial magistrates 
depends upon the human impossibility of assuming the “legislative point of view.” In this sense, this 
suggestion transforms us into strange creatures possessing impossible properties: the ability to 
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formulate “impartial” and “infallible” principles, while lacking the ability to provide anything but 
partial and fallible interpretations.44
 Given furthermore that the predicament of fallibility is shared by all human beings, the only 
political principles that a magistrate can make his own are those that are formulated by a non-human 
being, who knows what an impartial and infallible interpretation is. Such a being is God in Locke. In 
other words, the requirement of consistency is that Locke’s general principle cannot be divorced 
from its theological background. 
 
 Is it not possible to suggest that we can formulate principles without knowing all their possible 
consequences? (Such a consequence set would be the set of all possible and permissible 
interpretations.) This defense has no teeth. On their own, principles have no consequences; only the 
theories in which they are embedded do. If one and the same statement (after all, a principle is also a 
linguistic entity) has a different consequence in different theories, surely, one cannot argue that each 
of them is a consequence of that statement. Minimally, the consequences depend on other premises 
and the used rules of inference. In this sense, this avenue is completely closed to Tuckness. Here, we 
can see the weakness of his proposal even more clearly: no principle, on its own, has any 
interpretation. Principles which are embedded in theories are required to speak about their possible 
interpretations. One cannot simply extract some principle from Locke without extracting other 
claims, which enable a Lockean consequence. 
 Consider now the specific principle: only those beliefs and practices which are fundamentally 
harmful to civil society ought to be suppressed. Tuckness admits that this principle is problematic, 
since “there is disagreement about which beliefs, if generalized, would make civil society impossible.” 
Still, he concludes, “the gap between Locke’s position and the alternatives is not so great as to 
render his specific principle a mere historical curiosity.”45 
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 Again, the formulation is inadmissible, if proposed as a secular translation. No human being can 
know (infallibly) which principles, if widely held, would make civil society impossible. One can only 
entertain partial and fallible beliefs about the relationship between beliefs and the possibility of civil 
society. Because these vary in time and place, such beliefs create difficulties. 
 To illustrate this difficulty, take the historical example of Ancient Rome. The pagan citizens of 
Rome, including their magistrates, believed that some of the calamities that befell Rome had to do 
with the fact that the Christians and Jews did not worship the deities of the Roman Empire. The 
latter, in their turn, refused to worship the Roman deities, because the biblical God forbade idolatry 
and the worship of demons. According to the pagans, this belief, if widely held and practiced, would 
lead to the destruction of Roman society. Taking Tuckness’ specific principle, it follows logically that 
coercing the Christians and the Jews to worship the Roman deities would express Lockean toleration 
in this context. However, it would also violate Locke’s principles, because the Roman magistrates 
would impose their own fallible beliefs and interfere with the religious beliefs and practices of the 
Jews and Christians. So, one and the same act of coercing the Jews and the Christians into 
worshipping the Roman deities would express both toleration and intolerance.46
 The only route open is to bring infallibility back into the picture: one has to introduce a set of 
absolute principles authored by some being that is neither fallible nor partial. One has to also 
postulate that, no matter whether the interpretation is fallible and partial, violating such principles 
(objectively and independent of human beliefs) would make civil society impossible. Otherwise, 
inconsistency threatens: as in the case of Ancient Rome, the magistrate has to judge what religion is, 
what is harmful to civil society, and which practices ought to be tolerated and which not. In short, 
each magistrate judges, according to his beliefs, what is and is not “toleration.” This is not liberal 
toleration, but tyranny at its worst. 
 
 18 
 There is, even here, logic to madness: attributing the properties of God to humanity leads to 
tyranny by human beings. Believers do not see in God’s sovereignty any trace of tyranny or arbitrary 
rule, because God is both perfectly consistent and perfectly good. However, one cannot transfer this 
sovereignty to humanity without inviting tyranny, because of the human creature’s fallibility and 
partiality. In this sense, one is faced with the choice: either reintroduce Christian theology or defend 
tyranny in the name of toleration. In the first case, the Lockean principles are infallible and impartial, 
because they are revealed by God. But then, the same God has also infallibly revealed what religion 
is: it concerns spiritual worship, the soul and the conscience alone, and has nothing to do with civil 
society. This is what the theology of Christian liberty tells us. In short, one cannot simply get rid of 
Locke’s Protestant framework as though it is extra conceptual baggage; it is not. 
THE MODEL OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 
Locke’s model of toleration proved a perfect fit for many American states of the eighteenth century. 
Eventually, it would be translated into the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. 
Did this principle emancipate liberal toleration from its theological framework? This seems to be the 
case: God is not even mentioned in the American Constitution. 
 Historically, the principle of separation was defended by two distinct groups. There were 
“liberal Protestants” like the Baptists, Quakers and others, and “Enlightenment rationalists” or 
“secularists” such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.  
 The first group invoked the theological framework of Christian liberty and the arguments from 
seventeenth-century England in order to advocate liberty of conscience.47 When the colonies gained 
independence in 1776, this framework was translated into a legal and political form. The diversity of 
denominations in most states guaranteed that the right to worship God according to the dictates of 
one’s conscience would be protected by law.48 The different legal documents of the eighteenth-
century American states declared that all would be free to fulfill “the duty which we owe to our 
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Creator.”49
 However, it is argued that the separation of church and state was founded in religious premises 
for this group, while it was a secular principle for the Enlightenment freethinkers.
 These legal formulas were meaningful, because they could presuppose a common 
theological understanding of what religion is: namely, the duty and right of all human beings to 
worship their Creator in such manner as they see fit. 
50
 It is difficult to give a straightforward answer to this question, because Jefferson did not 
develop any clear theory. His thoughts on this matter must be reconstructed from a few paragraphs 
in his letters, legal texts and other writings. Nonetheless, these statements have shaped the American 
tradition of separation of church and state. Take the famous Act for Establishing Religious Freedom 
(1786). One cannot overstate its import, claims Susan Jacoby, “for, much to the dismay of religious 
conservatives, it would become the template for the secularist provisions of the federal 
Constitution.”
 Did the 
theological framework really disappear in the political thought of American founders like Thomas 
Jefferson?  
51
 At first sight, there is no conceptual break with the earlier theological model. In fact, the 
justification of the Virginia Act reads like a digest of Christian liberty. It talks about “the Almighty 
God who hath created the mind free” and emphasizes that temporal punishments related to religion 
are “a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our religion.”
 
52 These are obvious theological 
statements: it is God’s will for human beings to be free in matters of religion. Naturally, one could 
argue that the claims about God are “a rhetorical flourish, not a legal requirement.”53
 From the Virginia Act, it is but a small step to the famous establishment clause in the first 
article of the First Ten Amendments to the Constitution of December 15, 1791. Jefferson’s understanding 
 Can the 
theology in Jefferson’s advocacy of religious liberty indeed be dismissed as rhetoric? 
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of the establishment clause as “a wall of separation” appeared in a letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association (1 January 1802): 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he 
owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of 
government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that 
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a 
wall of separation between Church and State.54
The metaphor of the wall of separation has achieved an “almost canonical status” in the 
interpretation of the establishment clause of the Constitution and the American judiciary has made it 
“a virtual rule of constitutional law.”
 
55
 Strikingly, two out of three reasons which Jefferson gives for the separation of church and state 
are explicit theological doctrines. Religion is a matter between each human individual and his or her 
God and no other human being ought to intrude upon this relationship. In his Notes on the State of 
Virginia (1787), Jefferson had said that many still believe that the operations of the mind are subject 
to legal coercion, but rulers can only govern the domains which we submit to their power: “The 




 Nevertheless, some of Jefferson’s arguments appear secular at first sight. What remains of his 
case, if we discard all explicit theological elements? If we take away God from his account in the 
Virginia bill and his Notes, here is what remains: (a) Our civil rights are distinct and independent of 
our religious opinions. (b) Religious opinions are harmless to civil society and therefore civil 
government ought to leave these free. As Jefferson put it in the Notes: “The legitimate powers of 
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my 
 These were the principles of the theology of the two kingdoms. 
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neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” (c) 
Legislators are fallible men and therefore ought not to rule over the faith of others: “Subject opinion 
to coercion: whom will you make your inquisitors? Fallible men; men governed by bad passions, by 
private as well as public reasons.”57
 The first principle fails to provide a secular foundation for the separation of civil and religious 
society, since it presupposes the same. When one does not agree that religion ought to be separated 
from civil political society, one also fails to see why our civil rights should be independent of our 
religious opinions. Only the harm principle and the fallibility principle remain. Remarkably, these are 
the two principles that Tuckness also extracts from Locke’s theory. 
 
 We can again see the problem in these two principles, if we apply them to the plural societies of 
the early modern West, including Jefferson’s America. Many churches, magistrates and citizens of 
these societies were convinced that God would inflict catastrophes on a Christian society, if it 
allowed heresy, blasphemy, irreligion, or false religion. Other magistrates and citizens—radical 
Protestants and Deists, in particular—insisted that God would never interfere in civil society in this 
way.  
  If any magistrate were to implement the fallibility principle and the harm principle in such 
societies, he would face a conflict. According to the fallibility principle, he would have to 
acknowledge that both opinions about God and His wrath were held by fallible humans and should 
not be imposed on others. The harm principle, however, would lead to incompatible results 
accordingly as the magistrate held one of the two beliefs. If he believed that God would never 
interfere in earthly life, he could indeed insist that “it does me no injury for my neighbour to say 
there are twenty gods, or no god.” But if he held the other belief in God’s wrath, he would consider 
civil society to be severely affected by the same toleration. The two principles would conflict: in 
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order that the harm principle may lead us to toleration, we should impose our belief about God’s 
non-interference in temporal society on all citizens. 
 In Jefferson’s philosophy of toleration, as in Locke’s, this inconsistency does not arise, because 
the principles are based in the belief that religion is a strictly an individual matter between each 
human being and God. Hence, such claims as “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” that 
“religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,” and that we are answerable to our 
God alone for the rights of conscience are not rhetorical flourishes. They provide the theological 
framework necessary to make sense of Jefferson’s vindication of the separation between the church 
and the state. This framework can either be explicitly present; or it can shift to the background, as it 
has in the American common sense. 
 The conceptual problems arise precisely because one tries to extract two principles of the 
Protestant framework of Christian liberty, without heeding its theological constraints. The normative 
view of this framework claims that religion is the relation between an individual believer and God, 
which does not affect civil society in any way. As long as one holds this premise, the problem does 
not come into being. In Locke’s theory, both the consideration of human fallibility and the principle 
that all religions ought to be tolerated as long as they do not harm civil society are limited by this 
theological view of religion. One thing is certain: God’s wrath will not destroy a society that allows 
heresy and idolatry, since religion is the spiritual relationship between God and each human soul, 
which is distinct and independent of the bodily life in temporal societies. In other words, Lockean 
toleration is consistent within this theological framework. When one secularizes its principles into 





THE PREDICAMENT OF SECULARIZED THEOLOGY 
A common view says that “John Locke is the essential philosopher-advocate of liberal freedom and 
government—and of the state of mind designed to protect and spread them.”58
 The following hypothesis addresses these questions: the modern liberal conception of toleration 
has emerged from the secularization of the theology of Christian liberty and its separation of the two 
kingdoms. We read Locke as though his Christianity is but a religious layer that provided color to 
the essentially liberal structure of his political thought. He is the father of modern liberalism first and 
a Protestant believer second. We are wrong. His political thought is Christian to the core. We are 
right to identify the basic scheme of liberal toleration in Locke’s Letter. But this does not 
demonstrate that his thought is secular political theory. Rather, it indicates that the modern liberal 
thought continues to be religious, since it conceals an essentially theological structure in secular garb. 
 Why have 
generations of thinkers read Locke as though he was the father of secular liberal democracy? Where 
do the structural similarities between his conception of toleration and the modern liberal one come 
from? 
 The steps from Locke to Jefferson and beyond are not those of a rational Enlightenment, 
which extends its secular values to humanity, but those of an internal religious dynamic of 
secularization, which spreads Christian principles in a secular guise. The liberal model of toleration is 
constrained by the conceptual schemes it has inherited from its theological background. In this 
internal secularization of the Protestant religion, such a set of conceptual schemes is detached from 
the theological framework that made them intelligible and significant. These become the building 
blocks of normative political thought. 
 We can illustrate this process of secularization in terms of the puzzle of the two spheres. In the 
theology of Christian liberty, the division of human society into a sphere of political coercion and 
one of religious liberty does not cause any conceptual problems. It is founded in the Christian 
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anthropology: each individual human being consists of a soul and a body; and human life and society 
consist of spiritual and temporal realms accordingly. Human authorities can rule over the latter 
alone, for God is the only spiritual Lord. In Locke’s defense of toleration in the Letter, these 
theological elements are still explicitly present. They are necessary to make sense of his account, 
since it is simply impossible to identify any of the two domains without reference to these 
background beliefs. 
 Once we take the step to the modern liberal thought on toleration, however, the division of 
human society into a political and religious realm becomes a pre-theoretical starting-point. No need 
is felt to clarify it; it is simply presupposed. The consequence is opacity: one does not know how to 
identify either the private domain of religious liberty or its public counterpart. The problem emerges 
because the liberal notion of toleration is built on theological schemes, which have been rid of their 
“salient” Christian features. The puzzle of the two spheres is one of the conceptual problems that 
are bound to materialize when this theological background is ignored. 
 This puzzle becomes acute when liberal principles travel to societies that do not share the 
commonsense background of the West. Lacking both the explicit Christian theology and its 
secularized counterpart, the intellectuals of non-western societies are bound to tie themselves in 
knots while seeking to defend liberal toleration. As an illustration, consider the debates about the 
Uniform Civil Code in India.  
 From the 1930s until today, political representatives in India, who agreed upon the tenets of a 
liberal secular state, have disagreed vehemently about the implications of having such a state. 
According to some Muslim representatives, the principles of state neutrality and religious liberty 
entail that Muslim communities ought to be free to live according to Islamic personal law. Ordained 
by God, this personal law is part of their religion, they argue. Since a liberal secular state ought to 
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leave the citizens free to live according to their religion, it should not impose a Uniform Civil Code 
on Muslim communities.59
 The opponents of this position argue that religion does not encompass personal law. Therefore, 
the implementation of a secular liberal state entails that a Uniform Civil Code ought to be imposed 
on all citizens, irrespective of religious affiliation.
  
60 This dispute is not about the validity of the 
principles of liberal toleration, but about their meaning given a variety of conflicting conceptions of 
religion.61
 In the absence of a theoretical framework that conceptualizes religion and distinguishes its 
realm from the public realm, such debates threaten to become as interminable as disputes about 
taste. One lacks cognitive grounds to settle the issue. Either one takes recourse to common sense to 
do so or one invokes a stipulative definition. Here, no shared common sense is available; hence, the 
endless disputes that invoke conflicting definitions of “religion.”  
 It is a factual dispute about the nature and identity of religion: What characterizes the 
religious realm as opposed to other realms of society? Do such things as inheritance law, diet, mode 
of dress, etc. belong to the realm of religion or not? 
 To refer to the “essentially contested” character of notions like religion is to make it seem as 
though such disputes reflect a normal state of affairs. But the problem remains. In the seventeenth-
century debates about toleration among Christians, there was agreement on the principles of 
Christian liberty. However, the exact boundaries of the realm of religion and the implications of 
these normative principles were contested. Some claimed that religious liberty referred only to 
freedom to hold religious beliefs; others argued that it also encompassed the freedom to express and 
practice these beliefs.62 These debates took place against the background of a shared framework 
about the nature and characteristics of religion: the soul worshipped God; the eternal spiritual world 
was described in the Scripture. Such a minimal consensus, necessary to render the different positions 
intelligible, is precisely what is missing in the contemporary debates. 
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 This gives us a further insight into the relationship between the dynamic of secularization and 
liberal political theory. It is as though the Christian theological framework is retained, while its 
propositional content is almost rejected. If we see such a framework as a semantic structure 
containing both constants and variables (where the different interpretations of the variables provide 
us with different Christian theologies), and where the domain and range of the variables are 
constrained by the nature of the constants, then secularization implies this: the framework, together 
with its constants, fades into the background; yet, it continues to constrain the range and domain of 
the variables. The principles of the theology of Christian liberty are upheld by liberal toleration; the 
theological framework that gave such principles a body and content in terms of a conception of the 
world has faded into the background. 
 The secularization of the theology of Christian liberty also produces a series of normative 
principles as axioms of liberal political thought. Good examples are the right to religious liberty and 
the separation of state and religion. Both principles make perfect sense when embedded in 
Protestant doctrines, as they are in the writings of Locke. The norm that each human being ought to 
be free in the spiritual realm is sustained by a set of background beliefs about true faith as the work 
of God in the human soul. The necessity of the separation of state and religion becomes equally 
obvious when this understanding of religion is present in the background. To subject the domain of 
religion to the authority of the state is equivalent to subjecting God’s Will to human laws. 
 These norms had such an obvious character to Locke, because they were “willed by God.” 
When extracted from this theological framework, these principles seem to retain their self-evident 
character: all reasonable thinking on the problem of diversity in a democratic society should take the 
right to religious liberty and the separation of church and state as its starting points.63 Yet political 
theorists feel the need to provide normative justifications for these principles of religious liberty. 
 27 
 This is a consequence of the secularization of norms based in a specific religious account of 
religion and its liberty. One can no longer invoke the theological conception of human existence to 
justify the principles of liberal toleration. One feels the need to provide a secular justification; but 
one lacks the conceptual resources to do so. That is, no scientific theory is available today which 
identifies the realm of religion across different cultures and societies, and which explains what it 
means for religious worship to be free and why a human society needs freedom of religion in order 
to flourish. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that all theories of liberal toleration presuppose the truth of a Christian anthropology in 
one way or another. Their division of society into the two spheres and their claims about the 
freedom of religion depend on this background framework. Maximally, this theological 
anthropology makes sense also to Jews and Muslims, but it does not do so to others. 
 Naturally, in itself, the fact that some sentence or principle—say, “Man is born free, and yet 
everywhere he is in chains”—has a Christian origin does not make it religious. There is no hard-and-
fast distinction between religious claims (or theories) and secular ones. No semantic or epistemic 
property transforms some isolated statement into a religious or secular statement. However, our 
point is that a sentence like Rousseau’s cannot be intelligible or profound without a background set 
of beliefs. It is such a background that lends intelligibility, depth and poignancy to the formulation. 
 Even if such sentences or principles have a Christian origin, could one not provide them with a 
secular foundation? Only to those to whom such principles already have depth and poignancy, 
would it even occur to want to provide a secular foundation. From the perspective of Indian culture, 
for instance, the claim that “Man is born free, and yet everywhere he is in chains” is neither deep nor 
poignant, but false and trivial. In this sense, one can bring out the presupposition in the above 
question with a counter-question: why bother providing a secular foundation to a religious principle 
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at all? The only possible answer lies in the value and importance of that principle. But, on its own, 
the principle is opaque and unintelligible. Its value and significance are derived from what surrounds 
it: other beliefs. The principle is part of a religious Gestalt and what makes it appear valuable lies in 
it being a part of that Gestalt. 
 To appreciate the point better, consider the following example. Many Hindus would find the 
statement “tat tvam asi” (“thou art that”) a very profound, poignant and deeply moving truth. The 
idea lacks intelligibility, let alone truth, to someone who does not accept a set of other beliefs 
required to see its truth, simplicity or beauty. What would we make of an Indian claiming that this 
principle, even if discovered by Hindu sages some three thousand years ago, is valuable and requires 
a secular universal foundation? We would perhaps call such a person a Hindu guru, but would hardly 
consider him a political philosopher. Yet, the situation is no different from that of liberal thinkers 
like Tuckness and others today. 
 The liberal thinkers too propagate Christian principles. This does not mean, however, they do 
so in an explicitly theological fashion, the way Locke and his contemporaries did. The ideas about 
the two spheres and liberty are not limited to Christian theological tracts; they have taken the form 
of attitudes towards the world. Cognitively speaking, these attitudes function as conditions of 
intelligibility for certain ideas, like, for example, the value of liberal toleration or the nature of human 
freedom. 
 The problems that the liberal theories of toleration face today are those that emerge from trying 
to provide secular universal foundations and arguments for the notion of Christian liberty and its 
two kingdoms. It is like trying to show in a “secular” language that the claims of Christianity are 
true. The attempt is about as plausible as explaining the notion of “the Christ” without bringing in 
the notions of Original Sin, God and His promise to mankind. In other words, the Judeo-Christian 
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theology is the condition of intelligibility for the liberal theories of toleration. Where it is not 
available, these theories become radically unintelligible. 
 The consequences of this hypothesis come to light when liberal theories and institutions are 
extended to other cultures, which have not been shaped by Judeo-Christian religion. It has 
consequences within the West as well: this increasingly multicultural part of the world houses 
people, who are unrelated to the attitudes generated by the Judeo-Christian anthropology. How will 
such groups be accommodated in liberal nation-states, if the toleration model of these states 
reproduces and imposes a particular theological anthropology that lacks basic intelligibility to them? 
 Furthermore, the hypothesis downsizes the importance of research that presumes itself 
“secular” and “universal,” while being deeply theological. Instead, it calls upon political theorists to 
look for other, more secular foundations for our societies by studying how cultures other than the 
West have tackled and solved the problem of pluralism. In short, if we desire to find new solutions 
to the growing pluralism of our multicultural societies, it is advisable to stop looking at the world 
through Christian glasses. 
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